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Reforming the Law of Rape 
Stephen J. Schulhofer† 
Introduction 
The topic of contemporary rape-law reform holds a natural 
point of interest for this Symposium convened to celebrate the 
thirty-fifth anniversary of Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory 
and Practice, and in particular because of its commitment to 
paying tribute to its founding faculty sponsor, Catharine A.  
MacKinnon.  I congratulate the Journal’s editors on their very 
fitting decision to honor Professor MacKinnon, whose work over 
the past thirty-five years has been a major force for progress in 
affording women equal opportunity and protecting them from 
violence, in this country and around the world. 
In this Article, I undertake two distinct tasks.  First, I want 
to discuss what the laws against sexual assault ideally should look 
like.  But second, I also want to discuss rape law from the 
perspective of someone who has spent the past four years in the 
messy and frustrating work of legislative compromise, trying to 
design law reform that can be both progressive and enactable.  
There is an obvious contradiction in that regard.  The goal is to 
pass reforms that move society and our criminal justice system in 
a progressive direction, to the place where society ought to be.  But 
that means, by definition, getting broad agreement on principles 
about which people do not agree—at least not yet. 
Before I turn to that second part of the story, this Article 
addresses three points.  First, it sketches the traditional twentieth 
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am exceptionally grateful to Professor Catharine A. MacKinnon for stimulating my 
interest in these issues several decades ago and for incisively challenging my 
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I have especially appreciated the inspiration she has afforded me in matters where 
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century law of rape (still in force in some jurisdictions!) and 
outlines the reforms that were emphasized in the 1960s and 
1970s, before Professor MacKinnon’s impact was felt.  Second, it 
describes the distinct perspective that Professor MacKinnon 
brought to these debates and how it helped shaped the reforms 
that followed.  Third, this Article offers an outline of where we are 
now, the progress we’ve made, and some of the problems that still 
need to be addressed. 
This Article then turns to the second large part of the rape 
reform story and discusses the work of getting progressive reform 
enacted in the face of strong and determined resistance.  Part of 
that resistance is outright misogyny—unconscious or overt 
disrespect for women.  Although it is important to acknowledge 
that fact, this Article will focus instead on resistance that is not 
attributable to misogyny.  It can be hard to see that resistance 
sometimes reflects legitimate concerns which those of us 
committed to reform must understand and address. 
I. Traditional Rape Law and the First Wave of Reform 
(1960–1980) 
In the eighteenth century, Blackstone defined rape as 
“[c]arnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.”1  
Courts were obsessed with the idea that a woman might fabricate 
a rape accusation, so there were unique obstacles to conviction: 
requirements of prompt complaint and corroboration,2 including 
corroboration of unwillingness by proof that the victim had 
resisted to the utmost.3  Those requirements are now largely 
obsolete,4 but Blackstone’s core concepts—force and non-consent—
are now the focus of intense debate and disagreement. 
 
 1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210 
(Chicago Press ed. 1979) (1765–1769). 
 2. See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Michelle J. 
Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration 
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. 
REV. 945, 947–48 (2004). 
 3. See STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 20 (1998) (“The code 
preserved the rules requiring a prompt complaint, corroboration of the victim’s 
testimony, and special cautionary instructions to the jury”). 
 4. Only one state, South Carolina, maintains a prompt complaint 
requirement, and that rule applies only in cases arising between spouses.  Thirteen 
states retain limited corroboration requirements, and these have been narrowly 
restricted by judicial interpretation.  See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT 
AND RELATED OFFENSES 185–87 (AM. LAW. INST., Preliminary Draft No. 5, Sept. 8, 
2015) [hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE, Preliminary Draft No. 5).  This 
“Preliminary Draft” is part of an ongoing American Law Institute (ALI) project to 
revise the sexual assault provisions of the Model Penal Code.  It has not been 
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In the 1960s, the reformers who wrote the Model Penal Code 
(MPC) expanded Blackstone’s narrow concept of force, so that it 
could include nonviolent duress, like a threat to fire someone from 
a job or to take away custody of their children, in cases where such 
a threat could prevent resistance by “[a] woman of ordinary 
resolution.”5  States that generally followed the MPC in other 
respects, however, were not ready to accept its cautious extension 
of the law of sexual assault; they continued to define rape as a 
crime of physical violence.6 
In the 1970s, there was another wave of reform.  Strong 
feminist organizations and rape-survivor advocacy groups joined 
with the general tough-on-crime movement that became powerful 
in the 1970s.7  Politically, the reformers were almost unstoppable.  
Yet what stands out, in light of Professor MacKinnon’s subsequent 
work, is how modest the 1970s reforms were.  The top priority was 
to eliminate procedural obstacles and protect victims from abusive 
cross-examination in the courtroom,8 and those goals were almost 
entirely successful, at least in the laws on the books.9 
A 1975 Michigan statute was probably the most ambitious 
reform of its time.10  It enacted almost the entire victim-advocate’s 
wish list.11  For example, the statute repealed the resistance 
requirement and eliminated all reference to consent, because a 
non-consent requirement seemed to put the victim on trial and 
divert attention from the defendant’s misconduct.12  But from 
today’s perspective, what is striking is that the Michigan statute 
still required proof of physical force or threats of physical 
violence.13  Flagrant coercion still fell outside the reach of criminal 
law. 
In a 1983 case, an Illinois man accosted a woman on an 
isolated bike path.14  He was almost twice her size, and after they 
talked for a few minutes, he picked her up, carried her into the 
 
formally approved by the ALI, and therefore does not represent its official position 
on any of matters covered. 
 5. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (2)(a) (AM. LAW. INST., Proposed Official Draft 
1962). 
 6. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 1–10, 23–25. 
 7. Id. at 29–31. 
 8. Id. at 31, 33. 
 9. See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520h–750.520k (2014); see also MODEL 
PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES, PART II § 213.1 (AM. LAW. INST.1980). 
 10. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 35–37. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. at 31, 33. 
 13. See id. 
 14. People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983). 
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woods, and performed several sex acts.15  She was terrified, but 
because she never cried out or protested, the court reversed the 
rape conviction.16 
In a 1985 case, a foster parent threatened to send the 
fourteen-year-old girl who was in his care back to a detention 
facility if she did not submit to sex.17  The court upheld a 
conviction for corrupting the morals of a minor but reversed the 
rape conviction because the foster parent had not threatened the 
girl with physical force.18 
In a 1990 case, a Montana high school principal threatened to 
prevent a student from graduating unless she had sex with him.19  
The court held that the principal could not be guilty of rape for the 
same reason—he had not threatened her with physical force.20 
That is where things stood when Professor MacKinnon 
addressed rape in a powerful 1983 article21 and, of course, in her 
1989 book Toward a Feminist Theory of the State.22  By then a few 
courts were willing to say that coercive circumstances could 
sometimes be sufficient.23  But these were halting steps.  Even the 
most progressive courts were requiring some implicit danger of 
physical harm, for example, when an armed police officer 
implicitly threatens the victim with arrest.24  Nearly all courts 
were still asking whether the defendant’s conduct was essentially 
equivalent to physical violence.25 
II. MacKinnon’s Contribution 
What Professor MacKinnon’s work showed was that “force” 
has many faces, that the absence of physical force does not 
necessarily enable women to control, as she vividly put it, “what is 
done to them.”  Rape law could not justifiably assume that ability 
 
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 593. 
 17. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 396 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), aff’d 
by equally divided court, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988). 
 18. Id. at 404. 
 19. State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1103–04 (Mont. 1990). 
 20. Id. at 1107. 
 21. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: 
Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983). 
 22. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 
(1989). 
 23. E.g., State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 735–36 (R.I. 1987) (finding that a police 
officer who demanded a hitchhiker perform oral sex on him had implicitly 
threatened the hitchhiker with violence if she did not comply). 
 24. Id. at 737. 
 25. See id. at 737–38. 
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to control because, under conditions of gender inequality, social 
constraints and pervasive disparities of power can be decisive.26  
MacKinnon’s work laid bare the ways that women sometimes have 
no alternative except to acquiesce.  As she wrote in Toward a 
Feminist Theory of the State: 
[A]cceptable sex, in the legal perspective, can entail a 
lot of force . . . .  The adjudicated line [distinguishing 
rape from sex in specific cases] . . . commonly centers on 
some assessment of the woman’s will . . . [but] the 
deeper problem is that women . . . may have or perceive 
no alternative . . . [except to] submit to survive.  
Absence of [physical] force does not ensure the presence 
of that control [over what is done to them].27 
In other words, force runs on a continuum—the knife at your 
throat, the threat to throw you in jail, the threat to take away your 
job or your children, the need to placate a thesis supervisor—all 
these things can lead a person to tolerate and submit to unwanted 
sexual advances.28 
In the 1980s, a few courts finally started to understand this.  
For example, a Pennsylvania judge defined force as “[c]ompulsion 
by physical, moral, or intellectual means or by the exigencies of 
the circumstances.”29  Another court recognized that force 
“[i]ncludes ‘not only physical force or violence, but also moral, 
psychological or intellectual force [when] used to compel a person 
to’ [submit] . . . .”30  A 1995 Pennsylvania statute defined forcible 
compulsion to include “[e]motional or psychological force, either 
express or implied.”31 
Progress was also made from a different direction: instead of 
expanding “force” to include all forms of coercion, some reforms 
achieved a similar result by requiring consent, and then requiring 
that the necessary consent be “freely given” under all the 
circumstances.32 
In 1988, the Supreme Court of the United States reflected the 
older view when it held that the statute used to prosecute sex 
trafficking—the law against holding any person in “involuntary 
servitude”—applied only to traffickers who use physical or legal 
 
 26. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 22, 
at 178. 
 27. Id. at 173, 175, 177–78. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Commonwealth v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395, 404 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) 
(Spaeth, J., dissenting) aff’d by equally divided court, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988). 
 30. Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986). 
 31. 1995 Pa. Legis. Serv. Sp. Sess. No. 1 Act 1995-10 (S.B. 2). 
 32. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (1992). 
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compulsion.33  Congress overruled that decision and specified that 
coercion “[i]nclud[es] psychological, financial, or reputational 
harm . . . sufficiently serious . . . to compel a reasonable person [to 
submit] . . . .”34 
We cannot necessarily draw a straight line from all these 
reforms back to Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, but 
nothing else was as important as Professor MacKinnon’s work in 
severing the link between our understanding of rape and the 
expectation that the crime inherently involves aberrant physical 
brutality.  Her writing shattered the myth that force must mean 
physical violence.  Nothing else was as important in opening 
society’s eyes to the fact that many faces of force can compel 
submission just as effectively as threats of violence. 
So far, I have left out two important parts of this story.  One 
is pushback based on the argument that that women supposedly 
should not be pampered or “infantilized”—that nothing stops a 
woman from resisting a nonviolent sexual advance if she really 
wants to resist.35  I will say more about that below.  But first, 
there was reform that came from the other side of the fence: the 
feminists and victim advocates who did not really get the full 
MacKinnon message—I am especially pointing to the slogan, “no-
means-no.” 
I found myself under fire from some reform advocates in the 
1990s when I criticized the no-means-no movement.36  Obviously 
“no” must mean no. But pitching the argument that way does not 
go very far and its emphasis is badly misplaced. 
One thing Professor MacKinnon’s work makes clear is that 
the no-means-no idea puts all the burden on the woman to speak 
up, to resist, even when speaking up and resisting is exactly what 
social constraints and disparate power make it difficult or 
impossible for her to do.37 
 
 33. United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 932 (1988). 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4) (2012) (defining the serious harm that qualifies as 
coercion within (e)(2)). 
 35. E.g., KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER 67–68 (1993) (ridiculing the 
notion, allegedly underlying feminist reforms, that women are “[w]eak-willed, 
alabaster bodies, whose virtue must be protected from the cunning encroachments 
of the outside world” and that law must protect “[t]he cowering woman, knocked on 
her back by the barest feather of peer pressure”; insisting instead that “[t]he idea 
that women can’t withstand verbal or emotional pressure infantilizes them.”). 
 36. See Rebecca Whisnant, Feminist Perspective on Rape, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHIL. (Aug. 14, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-rape/. 
 37. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 
446 (2016). 
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Of course, some who supported the no-means-no slogan 
understood that; they just wanted to make sure that —at a 
minimum—a verbal protest would always be sufficient.38  
Unfortunately, however, the no-means-no mantra distracted 
attention from the main point, and reinforced the expectation that 
an unwilling person would protest.  Its subtext was—and still is—
that sexual aggressors are entitled to take for granted a woman’s 
availability unless and until she clearly and explicitly objects.  In 
addition, some reform advocates even made that assumption 
explicit.  In arguing for no-means-no, one feminist reformer wrote 
that “the jury has to believe that she did say ‘no’ . . . . Women 
should not be overprotected.”39 
My own work argues otherwise.40  For practical and 
theoretical reasons, willingness should never be assumed.41  
Arriving at the same conclusion from a somewhat different 
starting point, Professor MacKinnon writes in Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State that “[t]he deeper problem is that women are 
socialized to passive receptivity; [they] may have . . . no 
alternative to [passive] acquiescence.”42  Therefore, silent 
submission and actual willingness are not the same thing; one 
should never be equated with the other. 
That brings me to the current battle cry: “yes-means-yes.”43  
Here, the problem is similar to the one we encountered with 
respect to no-means-no: a well-intentioned, ostensibly progressive 
rallying cry misleads and fosters assumptions that ultimately are 
antithetical to effective reform.  The yes-means-yes slogan 
impedes genuine clarity in society’s understanding of the stakes.  
What the slogan is supposed to mean is that silence does not mean 
yes.44  People have to give permission; that’s the essential 
minimum.  But again, the mantra, in this case “yes means yes,” is 
drastically incomplete.  It distracts attention from the main point 
 
 38. Vivian Berger, Rape Law Reform at the Millennium, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
513, 522 (2000). 
 39. Id. 
 40. SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 267–73; see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 74–75 (1992). 
 41. SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 267–73; see also Schulhofer, Taking Sexual 
Autonomy Seriously, supra note 40, at 74–75. 
 42. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 22, 
at 177. 
 43. See MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, supra note 37, at 454–56 (describing the 
“so-called affirmative consent standard, understood as meaning that only when a 
woman says yes to sex is it not rape”). 
 44. Id. 
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because it reinforces the expectation that “yes” does mean yes and 
that a person who says “yes” is willing. 
We must be clear about this: for all the reasons that 
Professor MacKinnon shows, “yes” does not always mean yes.  In 
situations dominated by disparities of power, merely saying yes is 
not saying that I have freely made a sexual choice.45 
III. Where We Are Now 
We therefore remain a long way from a proper social 
understanding of the issues and the law’s role in addressing them.  
But first, the good news.  Two key points are mostly accepted.  
They are, first, that “no” is always sufficient to establish non-
consent,46 and second, that force does not always have to be 
physical force—other coercive circumstances suffice.47  To be clear, 
even these basic points still are not universally accepted in United 
States law.  We are still fighting these two elementary battles.48  
But for the most part, these battles have been won. 
Now the status report moves into more disappointing 
territory.  It should be an equally basic point that non-consent—
for example, a clear “no”—is sufficient by itself to make 
penetration a crime, even when there is no additional force of any 
kind: physical, psychological, situational, or otherwise. 
This simple proposition should not be the least bit 
controversial.  Unlike the first two points, however, this 
proposition is not close to being fully accepted in United States 
law.  In almost half the states, sexual penetration is not a crime 
 
 45. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 168–253 (discussing taints that result 
from disparities of power and trust). 
 46. Compare State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 227 (Idaho 2013) (“[V]erbal 
resistance is sufficient resistance to substantiate a charge of forcible rape.”), with 
John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-
Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1112 (2012) (providing an overview of how different 
states understand the necessary level of resistance to establish non-consent). 
 47. MODEL PENAL CODE, Preliminary Draft No. 5, supra note 4, at 45–47. 
 48. See generally Decker & Baroni, supra note 46 (discussing current gaps in 
the law in this regard). 
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unless there is both non-consent and some sort of force.49  
Penetration without consent is not, in itself, a crime.50 
This last point is emphasized for a reason; it is not a 
misprint.  All people (or almost all people) know, as a matter of 
common decency, that no one is supposed to ignore a clear 
expression of non-consent.  Today many students learn in high 
school, and nearly all college students learn in freshman 
orientation, that it is unacceptable to ignore a clear expression of 
non-consent.51  But that is not a criminal law requirement in 
almost half the states.  In all these jurisdictions, some sort of force 
is required, in addition to non-consent, to make out a crime.52 
I will come back to this legal approach in a moment, but I do 
not want to dwell on it, because it has finally become the minority 
view.  In a majority of states, it is finally true that non-consent 
alone suffices,53 and this is the recommendation currently before 
the American Law Institute in its revision of the sexual offense 
provisions of the Model Penal Code.54  This battle is not over, but 
the trend is clear.  The opposition is becoming weaker by the 
minute. 
That leaves two important issues where the trend is not clear 
and where reform still faces formidable opposition.  First, what 
 
 49. CAROL E. TRACY ET AL., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
19–20 (2013), http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/04-Meetings/sub-20150507/03_Rape_
SexAsslt_LegalSystem_WLP_AEQuitas_20120605.pdf (listing Alabama, the 
District of Columbia, Kansas, Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, and Washington as states that require both penetration without 
consent and without force). 
 50. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 2001) (noting 
that in Massachusetts, the offense “encompass[es] two separate elements each of 
which must independently be satisfied . . . beyond a reasonable 
doubt . . . (1) . . . physical force[,] . . . nonphysical, constructive force, . . . or threats 
of bodily harm . . . and (2) at the time of penetration, there was no consent.”); see 
also MODEL PENAL CODE, Preliminary Draft No. 5, supra note 4, at 52–53 
(“[Thirty-one] American jurisdictions impose [criminal] liability on the basis of 
nonconsent alone, without requiring any added showing of force.”). 
 51. Tovia Smith, To Prevent Sexual Assault, Schools and Parents Start Lessons 
Early, NPR (Aug. 9, 2016, 4:48 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/09/487497208/to-
prevent-sexual-assault-schools-and-parents-start-lessons-early; Beth Howard, How 
Colleges are Battling Sexual Violence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 28, 2015, 
2:58 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/28/how-colleges-are-
battling-sexual-violence. 
 52. See TRACY ET AL., supra note 49, at 19–20. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES at 
23–41 (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft No. 5 2016).  This “Council Draft,” also part of 
the ongoing ALI revision project, has not been formally approved by the ALI and 
does not represent its official position on any of matters covered. 
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counts as consent?  What is the minimum requirement?  And 
second, when that minimum requirement is met—for example, 
when you have explicit permission—what circumstances nullify 
that apparent consent?  When does yes not mean yes?  These are 
the places where the key battles for reform are now being fought. 
a. What counts as consent? 
Even among states that treat absence of consent as sufficient 
(together with sexual penetration) to establish the offense, there is 
wide and consequential disagreement about what “consent” 
means.  There are three options in play.  The first option says that 
to prove unwillingness, there must be some verbal protest.55  The 
second option says we should assume non-consent unless there is 
clear affirmative permission.  In the first option, silence and 
passivity always imply consent; in the second option, silence and 
passivity always mean no consent.56  In the third option, silence 
and passivity can imply either consent or non-consent, depending 
on all the circumstances.57 
In media accounts, the requirement of affirmative permission 
is often portrayed as a nightmare of fascist intervention in private 
life, as if all sex would be illegal in the absence of a written 
agreement—signed, sealed, and notarized.58  You would never 
know from the alarmist media hype that realistic standards of 
affirmative consent, signaled by words or conduct, are already the 
 
 55. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05(2)(d) (McKinney 2017) (requiring that “the 
victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a 
reasonable person in the actor’s situation would have understood such person’s 
words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the 
circumstances.”); NEB. REV. STAT § 28-318(8) (2016) (“Without consent 
means . . . the victim expressed a lack of consent through words, 
or . . . conduct . . . .”). 
 56. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 940.225(4) (2016) (defining consent as “freely given 
agreement”); State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992) 
(requiring “affirmative and freely-given permission”). 
 57. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 255-A(1)(A) (2016) (requiring proof 
that the victim “has not expressly or impliedly acquiesced”); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
566.061(14) (West 2017) (noting that consent “may be expressed or implied”); 
McNair v. State, 825 P.2d 571, 574 (Nev. 1992) (“Lack of protest by a victim is 
simply one among the totality of circumstances to be considered by the trier of fact 
[in determining whether there was a lack of consent].”). 
 58. See, e.g., Ashe Schow, Has the Federal Government Ever Had Sex?, WASH. 
EXAMINER (June 15, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/has-
the-federal-government-ever-had-sex/article/2565963 (“This new attempt to alter 
the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, a highly influential document that 
has been adopted in whole or in part by many states’ legislatures, is part of a push 
to bring authoritarianism into the bedroom.”). 
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law in many states, including Minnesota and Wisconsin,59 where 
these standards seem to work perfectly well. 
Equally important, it is crucial to explain why this is the 
right standard.  This standard simply says that people do not want 
to be sexually penetrated unless and until they indicate (by words 
or actual conduct) that they do.  Without that requirement, the 
law would, in effect, be assuming that people are always receptive 
to sexual intercourse (at any time, with any person) until they do 
something to revoke that permission. 
That is hardly an accurate description of ordinary life.  
Moreover, when we consider the specific contexts in which sexual 
abuse typically occurs, the point is even clearer.  Sexual 
interaction too often occurs when someone’s ability to express 
unwillingness is impaired, whether by fright, intimidation, 
alcohol, or drugs.  A standard that treats silence or passivity as 
equivalent to consent—a standard that requires people to 
communicate their unwillingness—presents enormous dangers of 
sexual abuse. 
b. What circumstances can nullify apparent consent? 
The second arena where the major battles over reform are 
now playing out is on the difficult question: when does yes not 
mean yes?  Obviously, “yes” is not authentic consent when it is 
given at the barrel of a gun.  The issue we are fighting over today 
is the same one that has been unresolved since the 1960s: what 
things other than physical violence make consent inauthentic?  
Broadly speaking, the major disagreement on this issue is between 
those who want the list to be very short—limited to things that are 
almost as coercive as physical violence—and on the other side, 
those who want that list to include many or all the other 
circumstances that limit a completely free choice. 
Before discussing the choice between grudging reform and 
very ambitious reform, it is worth mentioning a more abstract but 
nonetheless crucial issue of strategy.  This is an issue that divides 
those of us in that second group, those of us who agree about the 
need to protect against a broad range of coercive pressures. 
The issue here is the choice, familiar to law students and 
legal academics, between clear rules and flexible standards: 
 
 59. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.341(4)(a) (2016) (defining consent as “words or 
overt actions by a person indicating a freely given present agreement to perform a 
particular sexual act with the actor.”); WIS. STAT. § 940.225(4) (2016) (defining 
consent as “freely given agreement”). 
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should reform aim for statutes that specify which pressures are 
unacceptably coercive?  Or, should reform statutes prohibit 
coercive pressure in broad, general terms, leaving it for the jury to 
decide whether circumstances were too coercive in the context of 
each particular case? 
When you get into the details of legislative reform, this 
becomes a decisive issue, and committed reformers have different 
views, not only about which framework meets fairness 
requirements but also which approach is ultimately better for 
victims. 
Professor MacKinnon and I have had a friendly disagreement 
on this issue.  She proposes that the legal formula for identifying 
criminal conduct should be whether the sexual intrusion involved 
either “[the] threat or use of force, fraud, coercion, [or] abduction,” 
or also “the abuse of power, trust, or a position of dependency or 
vulnerability.”60  The Model Penal Code provision I have been 
drafting and working to get passed aims to identify in detail which 
circumstances involve prohibited kinds of force, fraud, coercion, 
exploitation, and vulnerability.  This means, of course, that the 
proposed MPC provision also identifies, by implication, the kinds 
of force, fraud, coercion, exploitation, and vulnerability—pervasive 
in any modern society—that do not suffice to establish criminal 
liability.61 
The advantage of the proposed MPC approach is that it sets 
boundaries for the criminal law that are as clear and specific as 
possible.62  On the downside, it is infinitely less concise than 
Professor MacKinnon’s conceptually phrased alternative.  Also, 
arguably on the downside for the MPC proposal (or an advantage, 
depending on your perspective), it would not reach various kinds 
of coercion and exploitation that could sometimes be prosecuted 
under Professor MacKinnon’s approach.  Examples of coercion that 
the MPC proposal would not prohibit, absent aggravating 
circumstances, would include the implicit pressure that can arise, 
even without direct or indirect threats, in interaction between a 
supervisor and a subordinate at work, between a public defender 
and the accused, between a wealthy older man and an 
economically vulnerable young mother, or between a popular 
 
 60. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, supra note 37, at 474. 
 61. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES, 
supra note 54, at 10–22, 42–80 (proposing sexual offenses based on specifically 
defined circumstances involving force, fraud, coercion, and exploitation). 
 62. See id. 
2017] REFORMING THE LAW OF RAPE 347 
athlete and an insecure student on campus.63  Indeed, Professor 
MacKinnon argues that the MPC proposal’s elaborate structure of 
rules and exceptions is “fundamentally beside the point.”64  
Referring specifically to the MPC revision effort I lead, Professor 
MacKinnon acerbically writes: 
Scholars debate granular details of the traditional elements of 
consent and force in sexual interactions in complex and 
esoteric ways, fracturing consent into a dozen forms with as 
many modifiers and force into multiple guises and levels, 
seldom assessing these elements themselves in sex equality 
terms . . . .  If rape is less a question of unwanted sex than of 
unequal sex, if equality not autonomy is its primary issue, if 
internal psychology is less determinative of these criminal acts 
than leveraged external conditions and gendered social 
behaviors, the existing conceptual framework, together with 
its lexicon of examples, has been fundamentally beside the 
point all along.65 
A far better approach, she argues, is to prohibit: 
[A]ll the forms of force that someone, usually a man, deploys 
to coerce sex on someone with less power than he has.  This is 
not only far more realistic in lived experience.  It is also more 
sensible, more humane, and more workable in legal practice.  
Coercion, including circumstances of social coercion, tend 
(with social hierarchies) to build upon and leave forensic 
tracks in the real world that are subject to investigation, 
observation, and evidence.  There are uniforms, positions of 
authority, traditions and triggers of dominance, well-worn 
consequences that flow from refusal of the desires of the 
dominant.  Even the psychological dynamics of coercion are far 
more externally observable in their referents than are those of 
consent.66 
The choice between these two approaches is very important 
and by no means easy.  As is often the case when it comes to 
translating reform aspirations into concrete legal form, the devil is 
in the details.  The differences among reformers on this issue, 
however, are much less important than the disagreement between 
all of us on the reform side and the large group of people who want 
to make sure that prohibited forms of coercion—regardless of 
whether defined by clear rules or by flexible standards—are kept 
within narrow bounds. 
 
 63. For detailed discussion of the potential abuses that can arise in these 
situations and assessment of the competing sexual autonomy interest of every 
individual to seek intimacy in mutually desired relationships, see SCHULHOFER, 
supra note 3, at 99–113, 168–253. 
 64. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, supra note 37, at 436. 
 65. Id. at 435–36. 
 66. Id. at 469. 
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Instead of going more deeply into the weeds on those issues 
here, I want to turn now to broader and more fundamental 
problems that we reformers face in trying to achieve progress.  
The most intractable problems we face involve trying to convince 
the large body of citizens who resist efforts to move forward, 
citizens who do not want criminal sanctions in this area to reach 
even one millimeter further than they already do. 
IV.  Resistance to Reform 
I will use three greatly oversimplified categories to describe 
groups that resist almost any reform of a relatively ambitious 
nature.  I will call them the misogynists, the low-information 
opponents, and the well-informed, very thoughtful opponents. 
Those that I call misogynists are those who do not make it a 
priority to assure the dignity and equal worth of people who 
happen to be women.  They may not even consider the condition of 
women in our society as a particularly pressing problem.  They 
simply do not see that women are disadvantaged, or they take 
male privilege for granted.  I am not going to say anything further 
here about this group.  Unlike some reformers whom I respect, I 
do not see people in this group as hopelessly beyond persuasion.  
We can and must think about ways to communicate with this 
group and enlighten them.  But this is not the place to pursue that 
issue. 
I want to focus here on the two groups of well-intentioned 
opponents: those whose views are shaped by low-information and 
those whose opposition springs from sophisticated concerns.  
These last two groups pose a larger challenge because they hold 
the balance of power in settings where reform efforts play out.  
These are the groups that we must understand and connect with if 
we want to make progress. 
The low-information group includes people who have decent 
values but a distorted picture of what rape cases really involve.  
They think they understand the problems, because they have seen 
TV shows about sexual assault on campus; they have heard TV 
pundits debating both sides of the issues in those cases; they may 
even have read newspaper op-eds discussing the pros and cons on 
the subject. 
I wish someone would study the amount of time and space 
that TV and the newspapers devote to campus sexual assault, 
especially cases involving upper middle-class, mostly White 
defendants, and then compare it to the time and space devoted to 
all other situations involving sexual abuse.  I do not know what 
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the numbers would show, but I do know that when my work on 
legislative reform runs into resistance, it comes far too often from 
people in policy-making authority who want to know how my 
proposals would apply to their own son or daughter who just 
started college.  That is a perfectly reasonable question for any 
parent to ask.  But lawyers, judges, legislators and others 
weighing the merits of public policy surely can be expected to 
consider the problem through a wider lens.  Yet ninety percent of 
the time, resistance to reform seems to come from decision-making 
elites who picture the typical rape scenario as a case involving two 
college classmates at a party, flirting, drinking too much, 
experimenting sexually, and not communicating with each other 
very well. 
Of course, rape-victim advocates vigorously challenge this 
picture of campus life by stressing how much deliberately 
predatory behavior occurs between classmates in college 
settings.67 Unfortunately, that kind of challenge inadvertently 
perpetuates the idea that the central problem our society faces 
today in connection with sexual abuse is the problem of too much 
drinking, too little communication, and too much boorish behavior 
on college campuses.  This pervasive assumption is dangerously 
misleading; it can almost be described as a myth.  My claim in this 
regard may seem counter-intuitive, and it is important not to 
misunderstand it.  Sexual assault on campus is a very serious 
problem.  Reform efforts must give it a great deal of attention, and 
it is a big part of my own work.68 
But focusing on these campus scenarios gives people—both 
those committed to reform and those who oppose it—a distorted 
picture of sexual abuse in the United States today.  The situations 
in which the serious inadequacies in current rape law become 
most salient and consequential include domestic violence, 
physically and mentally disabled victims, and gross discrepancies 
in age, power, or authority.  The salient abuses also include 
intoxication, of course, but not only intoxication involving middle-
class college students.  Equally important are cases of intoxication 
 
 67. See, e.g., Brigid Schulte, One in 5 Girls will be Sexually Assaulted in 
College. Here’s How to Help Change That, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/local/wp/2014/12/03/one-in-five-girls-will-be-
raped-in-college-eight-steps-parents-can-take-to-change-that/?utm_term=.298bb0
aa0275 (discussing the effects of campus sexual assault training focusing on 
identifying “predatory behavior”). 
 68. See, e.g., SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & RACHEL E. 
BARKOW, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 354–55, 403–05 (10th ed. 2017); 
SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 7–9, 14–15, 261–73. 
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in settings framed by poverty, domestic violence, and social 
deprivation of all kinds.69 
So, building a consensus for reform requires changing the 
narrative.  We must work to shake people free of the media’s 
obsession with young, inexperienced, middle-class peers in college 
settings.  We have thousands, probably millions of well-
intentioned citizens, people of good will and good values, who are 
stuck in the media narratives about naïve, inexperienced kids 
behaving badly.  These low-information people have to be 
reminded of the wide range of very different contexts in which 
current rape law fails.  They must be made aware of what the rape 
reform effort is really about. 
The third group, the last source of resistance I want to 
discuss, is the hardest.  These are well informed, highly 
sophisticated people with decent values.  They are intensely 
concerned about the injustice to defendants that pervades our 
entire criminal justice system: abuses of prosecutorial discretion; 
shocking racial disparities; intense leverage deployed to coerce 
guilty pleas, especially when the evidence is the weakest; overly 
punitive sentencing; mass incarceration; and by no means least, 
our overly rigid, vastly over-inclusive system of sex-offender 
registration.  This system often includes absurd, life-long 
restrictions on the offender’s residency, education, and 
employment, applied to offenders whose crimes, though serious to 
be sure, do not mark them with the potential for life-long violent 
recidivism.70 
One answer to all these concerns is that there are vast 
numbers of conscientious, dedicated police, prosecutors, and 
judges who work hard every day to make responsible judgments 
and pursue justice fairly and even-handedly, without overreacting 
to less egregious behavior.  Another answer is that in rape cases 
the failures of our criminal justice system usually lean in the 
 
 69. PA. COAL. AGAINST RAPE, POVERTY AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 71–84 (2007), 
http://www.pcar.org/sites/default/files/pages-pdf/poverty_and_sexual_violence.pdf 
(discussing the relationship between sexual violence and a number of factors such 
as age, homelessness, employment, and poverty generally). 
 70. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., RESIDENTIAL PROXIMITY & SEX OFFENSE RECIDIVISM 
IN MINNESOTA 2–3 (2007), http://www.csom.org/pubs/MN%20Residence%20
Restrictions_04-07SexOffenderReport-Proximity%20MN.pdf (“Not one of the 224 
sex offenses would likely have been deterred by a residency restrictions law . . . .  A 
statewide residency restrictions law would likely have, at best, only a marginal 
effect on sexual recidivism.”); see also Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws 
and Prevention of Sexual Violence or Recidivism, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 412 
(2010) (arguing that the current restrictions on sexual offenders might not achieve 
the goals they are meant to). 
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opposite direction: police and prosecutors who will not pursue 
meritorious cases, juries that will not return justified convictions, 
and outrageously lenient sentencing, especially in cases involving 
middle-class, White defendants.71 
For many of the victim advocates I work with, those answers 
are more than sufficient.  Many of them cannot imagine that it is 
in any way plausible to think of rape law as an area where our 
criminal justice system is too harsh or too discriminatory.  I wish I 
could fully agree with the victim advocates who hold that view, 
because it would make my job and my own commitments to reform 
much easier and much less conflicted.  I can certainly match every 
claim about unfairness to defendants with a dozen stories that 
demonstrate the opposite.  When I’m being honest with myself, 
however, and when I am trying to reach people of good will who do 
worry about racial discrimination, people who do worry about sex-
offender registration and harsh, inflexible punishments, I must 
acknowledge that there is no simple answer to their concerns. 
Both pictures have a lot of disturbing truth.  There is 
pervasive under-reporting and under-enforcement, pervasive 
unwillingness to credit well-founded victim complaints, and 
pervasive inadequacy of punishment in prosecutions that lead to 
conviction.72  All that is true.  Those problems exist to an alarming 
degree.  But victim advocates must be equally willing to 
acknowledge the opposing dynamic that exists side-by-side with 
that neglect: pervasive race bias and class bias in enforcement; 
pervasive abuse of charging power and plea bargaining; pervasive 
rigidity and disproportionality in punishment; pervasive 
overbreadth, overreaction, and inflexibility in the deployment of 
collateral consequences such as registration, community 
notification, and restrictions on public benefits, employment, and 
residency.73 
The vexing problem we reformers face in trying to craft a 
more protective law of sexual assault is resistance from decent 
 
 71. See, e.g., Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape 
Case Draws Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/06/07/us/outrage-in-stanford-rape-case-over-dueling-statements-of-victim-
and-attackers-father.html?_r=0 (discussing the role of privilege in sexual assault 
sentencing and convictions). 
 72. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 36–39, 42 (Candace Kruttschnitt et al. eds., 2014), 
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 73. See, e.g., CASSIA C. SPOHN ET AL., PROSECUTORS’ CHARGING DECISIONS IN 
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: A MULTI-SITE STUDY 3 (2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
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people who are well aware of un-redressed victimization but at the 
same time are acutely aware of extreme racial disparities and the 
wildly inconsistent responses our media and our society have to 
sexual abuse: extreme skepticism toward victim allegations on the 
one hand and on the other, almost simultaneously, indiscriminate, 
extremely harsh condemnation and punishment when someone is 
alleged to be or found to be an offender. 
The challenge for successful reform is to find ways we can 
maintain and strengthen our commitment to fair and 
proportionate punishment while also giving victims the much 
more effective protection they need from male aggression and all 
the other forms of exploitation and sexual overreaching that are 
still so pervasive in the United States today. 
 
